Paieškos galimybės
Apie mus Žiniasklaidai Paaiškinimai Tyrimai ir publikacijos Statistika Pinigų politika Euro Mokėjimai ir rinkos Darbas ECB
Pasiūlymai
Rūšiuoti pagal
Nėra lietuvių kalba

Pär Torstensson

Macro Prud Policy&Financial Stability

Division

Financial Regulation and Policy

Current Position

Principal Financial Stability Expert

Fields of interest

Microeconomics,Law and Economics,Financial Economics

Email

paer_niclas.torstensson@ecb.europa.eu

Other current responsibilities
2021-

Member, BCBS Quantitative Impact Study Group

2021-

Member, EBA Task Force on Impact Studies

2021-

ECB Co-coordinator, BCBS Policy and Standards Group

2021-

ECB Co-coordinator, EBA Standing Committee on Regulation and Policy

2021-

Member, EBA Sub-group on Credit Risk

2021-

Member, BCBS Credit Risk and Large Exposures Group

Education
2018

Yale Program on Financial Stability, Yale University, New Haven, United States

1997-2004

PhD in Economics, Lund University, Lund, Sweden

1992-1997

BA in Political Science, Örebro University, Örebro, Sweden

1994-1996

MA in Economics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

Professional experience
2020-2021

Principal Secretariat Official - SSM Secretariat Division, DG SSM Governance & Operations, European Central Bank

2011-2020

Principal Financial Stability Expert - Financial Regulation and Policy Division, DG Macro Prud Policy & Financial Stability, European Central Bank

2010-2011

Senior Economist - Financial Policy and Analysis Division, Department of Financial Stability, Sveriges Riksbank

2007-2009

Economist - Financial Policy and Analysis Division, Department of Financial Stability, Sveriges Riksbank

2009

Financial Stability Expert - Financial Services Policy Division, Directorate Financial Stability and Supervision, European Central Bank

2006-2007

Economist - Secretariat for Research and Analysis, Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication, Government Offices of Sweden

2004-2005

Post-doc - Department of Economics, Lund University, Lund, Sweden

Teaching experience
2004-2005

Microeconomics C (Bachelor/Master level), Department of Economics, Lund University, Lund, Sweden

1999-2003

Mathematics, Department of Economics, Lund University, Lund, Sweden

2 May 2024
THE ECB BLOG
Details
JEL Code
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
6 December 2023
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 23
Details
Abstract
This box reviews the final 2017 Basel III reforms, explaining the main elements and their objectives. It provides updates on how the reforms will be transferred into EU legislation via amendments to the Capital Requirements Regulation and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRR3/CRD6), as well as on the state of play of the implementation of the 2017 Basel III reforms in the United States and the United Kingdom. It also serves as a reminder that the reforms will make banks more resilient and will lead to higher GDP in the long run.
JEL Code
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
K20 : Law and Economics→Regulation and Business Law→General
6 December 2023
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 23
Details
Abstract
This article summarises the existing evidence of window dressing and seasonality of data at year-end reporting time for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Window dressing and seasonality of data distort the outcome of a point-in-time reporting framework, resulting in misleading bank disclosures, mismeasurement of bank risk, inappropriate capital requirements and misallocation of capital. Reduced activity at certain points in time can also be detrimental to market functioning and has the potential to amplify shocks that coincide with period-ends. These negative consequences are amplified by the global nature of the activities and the systemic risk of the banks concerned. Possible policy options for addressing this phenomenon include different reporting requirements, such as averaging over higher frequency data, to ensure that the measurement of a bank’s contribution to systemic risk and capital allocation is commensurate with its actual risk to the financial system and the real economy throughout the year.
JEL Code
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
17 November 2021
FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLE
Financial Stability Review Issue 2, 2021
Details
Abstract
Numerous European and national initiatives have been deployed since 2014 to reduce non-performing loan (NPL) stocks on euro area bank balance sheets. NPL ratios have fallen as a result, but very gradually, mainly thanks to sales to non-bank investors. Despite stronger market activity, prices paid by NPL investors have only improved marginally and continue to stand well below values assigned to NPLs by banks. One type of NPL that has proven particularly difficult to resolve is loans to non-financial firms that have borrowed from multiple banks – multi-creditor loans. Analysis of these loans relative to others finds lower provision coverage by the lending banks, reflecting more optimistic valuations by individual banks and limited recognition of the expected costs of multi-creditor coordination. This special feature proposes a strategy to overcome creditor coordination failures and costs, through the use of data platforms providing ex ante transparency to NPL investors. These, together with NPL securitisation, could substantially reduce the gap between the value of the loans booked on banks’ balance sheets and the prices offered by investors for NPL portfolios.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
10 November 2020
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 250
Details
Abstract
This paper contributes to the debate on liquidity in resolution by providing a quantitative assessment of liquidity gaps of banks in resolution in the euro area. It estimates possible ranges of liquidity gaps for significant banks under different assumptions and scenarios. The findings suggest that, while the average liquidity gaps in resolution are limited, the averages hide significant outliers. The paper thus shows that, under adverse circumstances, the instruments currently available to provide liquidity support to financial institutions in the euro area would be insufficient
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G33 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Bankruptcy, Liquidation
C63 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computational Techniques, Simulation Modeling
2023
ECB/EIOPA Discussion Paper
Policy options to reduce the climate insurance protection gap
  • Benalal, N., Ferdinandusse, M., Giuzio, M., Kapadia, S., Parker, M., Rousová L., Schölermann, H., Telesca, E., Torstensson, P., Christophersen, C., Kumar, H., Mazzotta, L., Scholer M., Schuermans, P., and Zafeiris, D.
2011
Riksbank’s commission of inquiry into risks on the Swedish housing market report
Tools and institutions for influencing house prices and household debt
  • Andersson, T., Claussen, C. A., Lagerwall B, and Torstensson, P.
2009
International Game Theory Review
An n-Person Rubinstein Bargaining Game
  • Torstensson, P.
2008
Social Choice and Welfare
Strategy-Proof Allocation of Multiple Public Goods
  • Svensson, L.-G. and Torstensson, P.
2008
Financial Stability Report, No. 2008:2, Sveriges Riksbank
From local to global – today’s crisis in the light of yesterday’s
  • Lind, G. and Torstensson, P.
2007
Sveriges företagande och konkurrenskraft. Internationell benchmarking
Energi
  • Torstensson, P.
2007
Sveriges företagande och konkurrenskraft. Internationell benchmarking
Makroekonomisk översikt
  • Torstensson, P.
2006
Ekonomisk Debatt
Fotboll och tärningskast. En spelteoretisk analys av straffläggning i fotboll
  • Torstensson, P.
2005
Working Paper Series, No. 2005:37, Department of Economics, Lund University
Evolutionary Dynamics and a Refinement of the Neutral Stability Criterion
  • Torstensson, P.
2005
Working Paper Series, No. 2005:38, Department of Economics, Lund University
Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining with an Asymmetric Breakdown Point
  • Torstensson, P.
2004
Ph.D. Thesis 123, Lund Economic Studies, Department of Economics, Lund University
Essays on Bargaining and Social Choice
  • Torstensson, P.
2001
Licentiate Thesis 67, Department of Economics, Lund University
Accession Negotiations and Third Part Expectations
  • Torstensson, P.