
# State Dependent Effects of Monetary Policy: The Refinancing Channel

Discussion by Benjamin Moll

Fourth ECB Annual Research Conference, September 6, 2019

- Exciting project!
- I learned a lot about mortgage market, refi decisions and how they are affected by monetary policy
- Main result: in countries with predominantly fixed-rate mortgages (U.S.), monetary policy's effectiveness depends on its history
  - "normal times": rate cut ⇒ many homeowners refinance mortgage ⇒ disposable income ↑⇒ C ↑
  - after long period of low rates (i.e. now!): almost everyone has already refinanced. Rate cut ⇒ only small *C* increase.
  - Example of state dependence, state = dist'n of "rate gaps"

### Story in graphs: 1. Rate gaps $\Rightarrow$ refis & consumption




#### FIGURE I

Mortgage-refinancing Activity in the United States over 2000-2012


Figure shows monthly average of Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) Refinancing Index (seasonally adjusted; March 1990 = 100) and the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage rate (relative to five-year moving average), also from MBA.

Source: Beraja, Fuster, Hurst & Ospina (QJE, 2018)


#### Story in graphs: 2. Monetary policy $\Rightarrow$ rate gaps




#### Story in graphs: 3. persistently low $r \Rightarrow$ everyone refi's



#### Story in graphs: 4. Cut r now? Small effect!



#### (Comment 0: simple time-series evidence?)




- 1. Empirical results on state dependence and how large it is
- 2. Quantitative lifecycle model (Wong, 2019) that match these
- 3. Policy counterfactuals
  - Authors place a lot of weight on quantitative results (as opposed to theoretical insight)
    - 2nd paragraph: "[Our] results are interesting to the extent that our model is a credible representation of the data."
    - So my comments are mostly about those as well


- 1. Place paper in macro literature on monetary policy & consumption
- 2. Some comments on quantitative model
- 3. A minor question on empirics

## Monetary policy and consumption (RANK, HANK,...)


## Monetary policy and consumption (RANK, HANK,...)




## RANK: all about intertemporal substitution (Euler Eqn)




#### HANK: emphasizes alternative direct effects...




### HANK: ... and indirect effects (given high MPCs)




#### We've come long way since rep agent Euler equation!



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
## This paper focuses on specific direct effect

- Paper focuses on specific but arguably very important part of monetary transmission mechanism (at least in U.S.)
- More generally
  - literature is growing very quickly
  - will be important (but challenging!) to put everything together and assess relative importance of different mechanisms

- Model in paper: all refinancing and moving decisions determined by "economic fundamentals" (financial incentives, lifecycle, ...)
  - essentially an (S, s) model of optimal inaction
  - this state dependence at individual level generates the aggregate state dependence that paper emphasizes
- But empirically, this is probably a bit extreme

- Model in paper: all refinancing and moving decisions determined by "economic fundamentals" (financial incentives, lifecycle, ...)
  - essentially an (S, s) model of optimal inaction
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- But empirically, this is probably a bit extreme
- 1. Refinancing:
  - households leave large sums on table (Keys-Pope-Pope "Failure to Refinance")
  - inconsistencies over time that violate optimal inaction
     (Andersen-Campbell-Nielsen-Ramadorai using Danish admin data)
  - ...

2. Moving: many reasons unrelated to economics - see next slide



Source: Ihrke (2014)

- Natural solution: add some time dependence or "Calvoness"
  - refinance/move randomly
  - natural conjecture: less state dependence at individual level would weaken aggregate state dependence
- Question: how would realistically calibrated "Calvoness" alter quantitative results?
- Note: most related paper by Berger-Milbradt-Tourre-Vavra has this (but they abstract from many other things that current paper has)

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
Paper focuses on particular moment of rate gap distribution: mean

 but seems unnatural: if everyone's locked-in mortgage rate < current rate, changes in current rate shouldn't affect refinancing

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
- but seems unnatural: if everyone's locked-in mortgage rate < current rate, changes in current rate shouldn't affect refinancing
- Indeed, time-series evidence seems consistent w this asymmetry



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- Suggests  $\mathbb{E}[r^{\text{old}} r^{\text{new}}|r^{\text{old}} > r^{\text{new}}]$  rather than  $\mathbb{E}[r^{\text{old}} r^{\text{new}}]$
- Appendix already shows robustness to using similar moments

• Also model suggests average rate gap  $A_{t-1}$  is insufficient statistic

| Rate path prior to a 50bp cut               | Average<br>rate gap<br>before<br>cut | positive rate | Effect on | Change in<br>consumption | Fraction ST constrained |
|---|--------------------------------------|---------------|-----------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| Panel A: Effects of Flat vs Rising History  |                                      |               |           |                          |                         |
| (i) Flat at about 3.5%                      | 0.00%                                | 100%          | 26%       | 1.3%                     | 0.48                    |
| (ii) Rising from 3.5% to 6.5% over 4 pds    | -0.81%                               | 16%           | 5%        | 0.1%                     | 0.64                    |
| Difference (i)-(ii)                         | 0.81%                                | 84%           | 21%       | 1.2%                     | -0.16                   |
| Panel B: Effects of Flat vs Falling History |                                      |               |           |                          |                         |
| (i) Flat at about 3.5%                      | 0.00%                                | 100%          | 26%       | 1.3%                     | 0.48                    |
| (ii) Falling from 3.5% to 1% over 4 pds     | 0.46%                                | 100%          | 23%       | 0.5%                     | 0.33                    |
| Difference (i)-(ii)                         | -0.46%                               | 0%            | 3%        | 0.9%                     | 0.15                    |

Table 9: Alternative paths of monetary policy

Average rate gap very different but refinancing rate very similar

• Also model suggests average rate gap  $A_{t-1}$  is insufficient statistic


| Rate path prior to a rate cut   | Average<br>rate gap<br>before cut | Fraction with<br>positive rate<br>gap, after<br>rate cut | Effect on<br>refinancing | Change in consumption | Fraction ST constrained |
|---|-----------------------------------|--|--------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Reloading Effect with 50bp cut  |                                   |  |                          |                       |                         |
| <ul> <li>(a) Benchmark case: continuously flat at</li> <li>3.5% prior to a 50bp rate cut</li> </ul> | 0.00%                             | 100%   | 26%                      | 1.3%                  | 48%                     |
| (b) 3.5% cut to 1% for 4 pds, rise for 3 pds<br>to 3.5%, flat at 3.5% for 1 pd                      | -0.28%                            | 66%  | 22%                      | 0.9%                  | 57%                     |
| (c) 3.5% cut to 1% for 4 pds, rise for 3 pds<br>to 3.5%, flat at 3.5% for <b>2 pds</b>              | -0.27%                            | 68%  | 26%                      | 0.9%                  | 58%                     |
| (d) 3.5% cut to 1% for 4 pds, rise for 3 pds to 3.5%, flat at 3.5% for <b>3 pds</b>                 | -0.25%                            | 70%  | 26%                      | 1.3%                  | 58%                     |

Table 10: Alternative paths of monetary policy

Another example: average gap different but refi rate same

Comment 3: How heavily do results lean on 2001-03?

- Sample period: 1995/99 to 2005
- Part of that period looks anomalous for refis, particularly 2001-03



• How heavily do empirical results lean on 2001-03? Robustness?

- Exciting project!
- Quantitatively credible results on specific but important part of monetary transmission mechanism
- Comments/questions:
  - 0. simple time-series evidence
  - 1. time dependence/"Calvoness"?
  - 2. focus on average rate gap?
  - 3. how heavily do results lean on 2001-03?