

# Eurosystem's asset purchases and money market rates

William Arrata, Benoit Nguyen,  
Imene Rahmouni-Rousseau, and Miklos Vari


Discussant: Angelo Ranaldo

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# The paper in a nutshell




# Representativeness of this segment?



Around 19% ... 

# Many factors ... Mission impossible?



# Many factors ... Mission impossible? Not really

How can one handle such a complex system and many factors?


- Panel Regressions!

Good econometric method ...



- Unless you have all data for a perfect identification strategy, Fixed Effects help capture ...
  - Bond FE: bond characteristics (e.g. maturity, coupon, ...)
  - Country FE: country features (e.g. haircuts, sovereign, ...)
  - Time FE: a bundle of underlying driving forces (e.g. Excess Liquidity ...)
  - ... and switching off time-FE, one can try to quantify some “underlying driving forces” or “calendar” effects such as End-of-Quarter, EoM, ...

# Main findings



PSPP ↑  
also  
EL ↑  
MRO/LTRO ↑


Special rates ↓  
More for:  
On-the-Run  
C-t-D  
if bonds held by agents with  
rigid demand  
if issued by GE, IT, SP

# Comment 1: Which research question?

Two main questions:


- Why repos are traded below the ECB Deposit Facility Rate (DFR)?
  - But there is no regression analysis
- How the PSPP program affect repo markets?
  - There is a regression analysis but only for Specials
- Both are very important questions!
- **Focus** on one of them and provide an **in-depth analysis**

# About Q1: Market share below DFR






# About Q1: Market share below DFR



# About Q2: What drives GC repo rates?



## Comment 2: Where is “Specialness”?

- Explained variable:  $r_t^{SP,i}$
- Challenging  $r_t^{GC,i} - r_t^{SP,i}$  as the measure of Specialness e.g. Corradin, Maddaloni (2017), Ferrari et al. (2017).
- ... because  $r_t^{GC,i}$  is **not** a risk-free rate
- ... because country i can become SPECIAL as a whole
  
- But then  $r_t^{GC,i}$  is neglected in the regression analysis
- Can one really explain  $r_t^{SP,i}$  ignoring  $r_t^{GC,i}$ ?
- Mmmmmm ...
  - Economically it's hard to argue this
  - Econometrically, omitted  $\Delta$  bias


## Comment 2: Where is “Specialness”?

- Let's look at specialness as  $\theta^i r_t^{GC,i} - r_t^{SP,i}$ . Previous literature imposes  $\theta^i = 1$ . But you can generalize this ...
- Option 1 (static):
  - $\theta^i r_t^{GC,i} - r_t^{SP,i} = f(PSPP_t, \dots) + \varepsilon_t^i$
  - $r_t^{SP,i} = f(PSPP_t, \theta^i r_t^{GC,i}, \dots) + \varepsilon_t^i$
- Option 2 (dynamic), e.g.  $\theta_t^i r_t^{GC,i} - r_t^{SP,i}$  2-stage approach ...
  - Step 1: every week  $\tau$  you regress  $r_\tau^{GC,i} = \dots + \theta^i PSPP_\tau + \varepsilon_\tau^i$  and collected a weekly time series of  $\hat{\theta}_\tau$
  - Step 2:  $r_{\tau+1}^{SP,i} = f(PSPP_{\tau+1\tau}, \hat{\theta}_\tau, \dots) + \varepsilon_{\tau+1}^i$
- Option 3: a **unique** risk-free rate exists!  $r_t^{RF} - r_t^{SP,i}$ 
  - What can  $r_t^{RF}$  be? DFR? GCP? ...

# Other points

- Calendar effects
  - Your findings: EoM and EoQ, rates down
  - BIS (2017): since mid-2015 repo rates referencing German and French collateral have spiked downwards at period-ends, while those against Italian and Spanish collateral have continued to spike **upwards**.
- EU versus U.S.
  - EU repo rates below DFR similar to the U.S experience, i.e. mm rates below the rate of interest on excess reserves (IOER)?
  - Lack of arbitrage: Trading **non-anonymity**, **relationships** and **bargaining power** are key Bech and Morten (2011)

# Overall

- A very interesting paper !!! 
- The first serious attempt to see how the PSPP program affects European repos
- Multiple research questions and interesting ideas. Center your analysis on one of them and make the rest ancillary ...
- Very promising regression results on Specials. What about GC?

# Appendix

# What drives GC rates?

