

Discussion: The Interest of Being Eligible

Mesonnier, O'Donnell and Toutain (2017)

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Disclaimer: The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB

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- ⇒ **Relevant question, very interesting paper**

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- **What is the effect on the "control" loans?**
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- **Confounding effects:** Is part of the effect attributed to LTRO?
 - LTRO might have a different effect for the low than the high borrower types
 - If so, you are over/under-estimating the effect of the ACC

Comments #2: Compare to traditional liquidity (1/2)

Framework

One relevant question that this paper could touch upon:

Should the regulator increase traditional liquidity or collateral liquidity?

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- **Traditional liquidity:** Ability to quickly sell (or buy) at "fundamental price"
 - e.g. *When selling:* You get cash + You are no longer exposed to asset's risk

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- **Traditional liquidity:** Ability to quickly sell (or buy) at "fundamental price"
 - *e.g. When selling:* You get cash + You are no longer exposed to asset's risk
 - **Collateral liquidity:** Ability to quickly get (provide) cash at "fundamental rate"
 - *e.g. When selling:* You get cash but you are still exposed to the asset's risk
- ⇒ **Collateral liquidity is a substitute: Both types of liquidity allow to get cash**
⇒ **Collateral liquidity is an innovation: Allows to separate cash from risk**

Comments #2: Compare to traditional liquidity (2/2)

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- Prediction: Lower securitization volume \Rightarrow Larger post-ACC change

2 Test the extent in which collateral liquidity is an innovation

- Prediction: Riskier asset \Rightarrow Larger post-ACC change

If you're lucky, securitization volume is not fully determined by risk

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- 1 **Strengthen current results:** Look into the magnitude of the effects
 - How the pie is shared
 - How the effect goes beyond the newly eligible loans
 - Make sure you do not capture LTRO
- 2 **Generate new results:** Test substitutability and innovation of collateral liquidity