Selection in Information Acquisition and Monetary Non-Neutrality

Hassan Afrouzi Columbia University Choongryul Yang Federal Reserve Board


Inflation: Drivers and Dynamics Conference 2021

The views expressed in this presentation are solely our own and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or of any person associated with the Federal Reserve System.

- The average firm is highly uncertain about economic outcomes.
- But there is a high degree of heterogeneity in subjective uncertainty.
- This Paper: Whose expectations matter for macroeconomic outcomes?
- Summary:
 - Subjective uncertainty is *positively* correlated w/ time since last price change (*selection*)
 - A model with state-dependent information acquisition explains this selection
 - Only *the most informed* firms' expectations matter for output response

Motivation

Subjective uncertainty: standard deviation of belief about desired price change



There is a lot of heterogeneity in uncertainty across firms.

Motivation

Firms that changed their prices more recently have more accurate expectations.				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable: Subjective und	certainty about fir	ms' desired price	changes	
Dummy for price changes (last 12 months)	-0.112* (0.057)	-0.210*** (0.063)	-0.265*** (0.056)	
Time elapsed since price change				0.010* (0.005)
Observations	485	488	486	487
R-squared	0.061	0.170	0.243	0.188
Industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm-level controls		Yes	Yes	Yes
Manager controls			Yes	Yes

Model: Rational Inattention + Calvo

Model: Firms, Shocks and Payoffs.

- Time is continuous and indexed by $t \ge 0$.
- There is a measure of price-setting firms indexed by $i \in [0, 1]$.
- *i*'s instantaneous profit:

$$\bar{\Pi} - B(p_{i,t} - p_{i,t}^*)^2$$

• Each firm follows an exogenous *desired* price:

$$\mathrm{d}p_{i,t}^* = \sigma \mathrm{d}W_{i,t}$$

• Price change opportunities arrive at Poisson rate θ (Calvo).

Model: Information Structure and Cost of Attention.

• Firm *i* does not observe $p_{i,t}^*$ but see a signal process over time:

 $\mathrm{d}s_{i,t} = p_{i,t}^* \mathrm{d}t + \sigma_{\mathrm{s},i,t} \mathrm{d}W_{\mathrm{s},i,t}$


Information sets:

$$S_{i,t} = \{S_{i,\tau} : 0 \le \tau \le t\} \cup S_{i,0}, S_{i,0}$$
 given.

- Attention problem: firm chooses $\sigma_{s,i,t} \in \mathbb{R}_+ \cup \{\infty\}$ for all $t \ge 0$.
- · Cost of information increases with rate of reduction in differential entropy

$$C(\mathrm{dI}(P_{i,t}^*;S_{i,t})): \quad C'(.) \ge 0, \quad \mathbb{I}(P_{i,t}^*;S_{i,t}) \equiv h(P_{i,t}^*|S_{i,0}) - h(P_{i,t}^*|S_{i,t})$$

Model



Model

$$\min_{\{\sigma_{s,i,t} \ge 0, \tilde{p}_{i,t}: t \ge 0\}} \mathbb{E}\left[\int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \left[\underbrace{B(p_{i,t} - p_{i,t}^{*})^{2} dt}_{\text{loss from mis-pricing}} + \underbrace{C(d\mathbb{I}(P_{i,t}^{*}; S_{i,t}))}_{\text{cost of information}}\right] |S_{i,0}]$$

s.t. $dp_{i,t} = (\tilde{p}_{i,t} - p_{i,t}) d\chi_{i,t}, \chi_{i,t} \sim \text{Poisson}(\theta)$
 $ds_{i,t} = p_{i,t}^{*} dt + \sigma_{s,i,t} dW_{s,i,t}, S_{i,0}, p_{i,0} \text{ given.}$

Model

$$\min_{\{\sigma_{s,i,t} \ge 0, \tilde{p}_{i,t}: t \ge 0\}} \mathbb{E}\left[\int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \left[\underbrace{B(p_{i,t} - p_{i,t}^{*})^{2} dt}_{\text{loss from mis-pricing}} + \underbrace{C(d\mathbb{I}(P_{i,t}^{*}; S_{i,t}))}_{\text{cost of information}}\right] |S_{i,0}]$$

s.t. $dp_{i,t} = (\tilde{p}_{i,t} - p_{i,t}) d\chi_{i,t}, \chi_{i,t} \sim \text{Poisson}(\theta)$
 $ds_{i,t} = p_{i,t}^{*} dt + \sigma_{s,i,t} dW_{s,i,t}, S_{i,0}, p_{i,0} \text{ given.}$

Today, two extremes of convexity for C(dI):

• Linear: $C_L(\mathrm{d}\mathbb{I}) = \omega \mathrm{d}\mathbb{I}$

• Extremely Convex:
$$C_F(\mathrm{d}\mathbb{I}) = \begin{cases} 0 & \mathrm{d}\mathbb{I} \leq \bar{\lambda} \mathrm{d}t \\ \infty & \mathrm{d}\mathbb{I} > \bar{\lambda} \mathrm{d}t \end{cases}$$

Definition We define firm i's **true price gap** and **perceived price gap**, and **subjective uncertainty** as

$$x_{i,t}^* \equiv p_{i,t}^* - p_{i,t}, \ x_{i,t} \equiv \mathbb{E}[x_{i,t}^*|S_{i,t}], \ z_{i,t} \equiv \mathbb{V}ar(x_{i,t}^*|S_{i,t})$$

respectively.

State variables for firm's problem: (belief distribution about $x_{i,t}^*$)

- $x_{i,t}$: how much firm **thinks** its price is from optimal price
- $z_{i,t}$: subjective uncertainty

Results

Results

Theorem (Optimal Information Acquisition with Linear Cost)

- 1. It is optimal for firms to never acquire information in between price changes, and uncertainty grows linearly with time.
- 2. Upon the arrival of an opportunity for a price change, firm acquires enough information to reset their uncertainty to *Z*^{*} where

$$\frac{1}{Z^*} = \frac{B}{\omega(\rho+\theta)} + \theta \int_0^\infty e^{-(\rho+\theta)h} \frac{1}{Z^* + \sigma^2 h} dh$$
(1)

Results

Theorem (Optimal Information Acquisition with Linear Cost)

- 1. It is optimal for firms to never acquire information in between price changes, and uncertainty grows linearly with time.
- 2. Upon the arrival of an opportunity for a price change, firm acquires enough information to reset their uncertainty to *Z*^{*} where

$$\frac{1}{Z^*} = \frac{B}{\omega(\rho+\theta)} + \theta \int_0^\infty e^{-(\rho+\theta)h} \frac{1}{Z^* + \sigma^2 h} dh$$
(1)

Proposition (Optimal Information Acquisition with Convex Cost) All firms have the same uncertainty, independent of their state:

$$z = \frac{\sigma^2}{\bar{\lambda}}$$

Aggregation


Proposition The time invariant distribution of uncertainty

• with the convex cost is a univariate degenerate distribution at $\frac{\sigma^2}{\lambda}$.

Aggregation

Proposition The time invariant distribution of uncertainty

- with the convex cost is a univariate degenerate distribution at $\frac{\sigma^2}{\Lambda}$.
- with the linear cost is an exponential with rate θ/σ^2 shifted by Z^{*}.



Implications for Monetary Non-Neutrality

• Consider a permanent shock to $x_{i,0}^*$ of size δ , and define

$$M(x,z,\delta) = \int_0^\infty \mathbb{E}_0 \left[y_{i,t} | x_{i,0}^* = x + \delta, z_{i,t} = z \right] \mathrm{d}t, \quad \mathcal{M}(\delta) = \int M(x,z,\delta) \tilde{F}(\mathrm{d}x,\mathrm{d}z)$$

Theorem (Sufficient statistic with linear cost)

Cumulative response of output to a 1 percent monetary shock (area under IRF):



• Main takeaway:

Only the most informed firms' expectations matter for monetary non-neutrality

- Evidence suggests there is selection in information acquisition.
- This is consistent with a state-dependent information acquisition model.
- Selection implies that only the most informed firms' expectations matter for output response to monetary shocks.

• Can we still identify non-neutrality of money from distribution of price changes?

• Can we still identify non-neutrality of money from distribution of price changes? No.

Proposition

The distribution of price changes is invariant to Z*.

• Can we still identify non-neutrality of money from distribution of price changes? No.

Proposition

The distribution of price changes is invariant to Z*.

Intuition of Proof: take an arbitrary price change,

$$\Delta p_{i,t} = \lambda_{i,t} (p_{i,t}^* + noise - p_{i,t-h})$$
(4)

• Optimality of $\lambda_{i,t}$ implies $var(\Delta p_{i,t}) = \sigma^2 h$.

• Can we still identify non-neutrality of money from distribution of price changes? No.

Proposition

The distribution of price changes is invariant to Z*.

Intuition of Proof: take an arbitrary price change,

$$\Delta p_{i,t} = \lambda_{i,t} (p_{i,t}^* + noise - p_{i,t-h})$$
(4)

- Optimality of $\lambda_{i,t}$ implies $var(\Delta p_{i,t}) = \sigma^2 h$.
- So $\Delta p_{i,t}$ is generated by a Brownian motion of scale σ .

• Can we still identify non-neutrality of money from distribution of price changes? No.

Proposition

The distribution of price changes is invariant to Z*.

Intuition of Proof: take an arbitrary price change,

$$\Delta p_{i,t} = \lambda_{i,t} (p_{i,t}^* + noise - p_{i,t-h})$$
(4)

- Optimality of $\lambda_{i,t}$ implies $var(\Delta p_{i,t}) = \sigma^2 h$.
- So $\Delta p_{i,t}$ is generated by a Brownian motion of scale σ .
- In hypothetical economy assign $\Delta p_{i,t}$ to a firm whose ideal price is $p_{i,t}$.

• Can we still identify non-neutrality of money from distribution of price changes? No.

Proposition

The distribution of price changes is invariant to Z*.

Intuition of Proof: take an arbitrary price change,

$$\Delta p_{i,t} = \lambda_{i,t} (p_{i,t}^* + noise - p_{i,t-h})$$
(4)

- Optimality of $\lambda_{i,t}$ implies $var(\Delta p_{i,t}) = \sigma^2 h$.
- So $\Delta p_{i,t}$ is generated by a Brownian motion of scale σ .
- In hypothetical economy assign $\Delta p_{i,t}$ to a firm whose ideal price is $p_{i,t}$.
- The hypothetical economy is as if it has no information frictions but has the same distribution of price changes.

• Because it takes time for firms to become aware of the shock when it is unannounced:

$$db = -\lambda(z)b + U$$

 $\lambda(z) = 1 - \frac{Z^*}{z}$

• In fact:

$$\mathcal{M}(F_b) - \mathcal{M}(F_x) = \frac{Z^*}{\sigma^2}$$

• Need to know uncertainty conditional on price change.