


TARGET2 incident on 23 October 2020



AMI-Pay/SeCo 3 December 2020 **Sylvain Debeaumont**Market Infrastructure Management Division



Content

- 1. Main facts
- 2. Communication
- 3. Business impact
- 4. Next steps

Key steps (1/3)

23/10	14:40	TARGET2 unavailable on the primary site in Germany
	15:15	1st conference call of TARGET2 Crisis Managers
	15:30	1st communication to participants
	16:30	ECONS reported as not available
		Attempts to activate intra-region failover to secondary site in Germany
	20:30	Intra-region failover reported as not feasible
		Decision to activate an inter-region failover to the secondary site in Italy
	22:30	Technical completion of the inter-region failover
		Decision not to apply the Restart After Disaster (RAD)
		ICM available
	23:10	AS settlement and A2A traffic resumed
		FIN settlement resumed and stopped again
		SWIFT servers to be restarted manually



Key steps (2/3)

24/10	01:20	FIN settlement resumed
	03:00	Cut-off for customer payments
	03:30	Cut-off for interbank payments
		All payments in the queues have been processed (incl. T2S liquidity transfers)
	04:15	Blockage in Standing Facility module
	05:10	Opening of 26/10/2020 value date
	05:55	Start of TARGET2 night-time settlement (phase 1)
25/10	18:00	Communication to the market
26/10	01:00	TARGET2 reopening for night-time settlement (phase 2)
	07:00	TARGET2 reopening for daylight phase
	18:00	TARGET2 end of day
28/10	13:00	Update on the communication to the market
	19:00	3CB initial incident report
01/11		Failing over back to the primary site in Germany



Key steps (3/3)

23/10	15:30	1st conference call of T2S Settlement Managers
	15:45	1st conference call of T2S Crisis Managers
		1st decision to delay the DvP cut-off
	21:05	Decision to move on with DvP cut-off at 21:30
	21:45	Problem in RMIC (reimbursement of autocol)
24/10	03:30	Decision to delay the maintenance window to 08:00
	03:01	RMIC completed (reimbursement of autocoll)
	03:17	GOLT completed (cash sweep to TARGET2)
	03:30	T2S end of day started
	06:05	Start of T2S night-time settlement
	07:30	Completion of night-time settlement
26/10	05:00	Reopening of T2S for real-time settlement
	15:30	Delay of DvP cut-off by one hour (upon request of one NCB)
	18:00	T2S end of day started
	20:01	Start of T2S night-time settlement
28/10	09:00	UTEST available for user tests again but the normal schedule was only followed as of 29 October



Problems reported by participants

- Many actors not aware of the existence of the TARGET2 Webpage.
- Banks not sufficiently informed about the procedure to follow after an inter-region failover.
- Many banks and ancillary systems could not resend the traffic (not capable of resending or systems already closed).
- Critical ancillary system transactions settled but missing ACH SEPA files, causing late transfer of funds to beneficiaries.
- Banks did not transfer their excess of reserves to OVN deposit accounts.
- Number of reconciliation problems somehow contained (some dozens of payments).
- Problem of relocation of collateral for some DCPs.

3CB incident report

- Initial incident report delivered on 28/10
- Root cause of the incident:

"The incident root cause is attributed to a third-party network device problem classified as a major severity.

In the context of a change planned in the weekend for activating new network switches, a preparatory activity has been conducted for the devices still logically disconnected from the network in production (with all of the involved ports in disabled mode).

The configuration parameter applied on the 4CBnet-NG switches, as part of this preliminary activity already started on Thursday and successfully executed on six out of eight devices, triggered on Friday a software bug. Although it was known to the vendor since May 2020, the bug was documented neither in the product manuals nor in the relevant release notes."

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
Communication

- During the incident
- 17 conference calls of TARGET2 Crisis Managers
- 15 communications to participants using the MID-RSS tool




Communication

- After the incident
- 1 communication published on Sunday 18:00
- 1 update published on Wednesday 13:00




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Timely distribution




- Roughly 65% of the daily traffic in value and 85% of the daily turnover was already settled at the time of the incident
- Progressive restart of services clearly visible after 1:00 am




Compared to the last two Fridays:

- Turnover 10-15% lower
- Traffic 3-5 % lower




- Most affected categories:
- Ancillary systems settlement
- Interbank payments



Most affected communities: DE, FR


Rejected payments Total value and volume of rejected transactions 1,000 14 900 12 800 10 700 EUR billion 600 500 400 300 200 100 09 October 16 October 23 October ■Rejected value (LHS) Rejected volume (RHS)

- More than 900 transactions
- Approximately 12 bn €




Most affected categories:


- Ancillary systems settlement
- Interbank payments



Most affected communities: DE, FR, FI, ECB, NL


Recourse to standing facilities





- 11 banks had recourse to MLF for €19 million
- Approximately € 400 bn less on overnight deposit accounts

System availability



Technical availability (yearly basis) at the lowest level since the migration to TARGET2 in May 2008

Next steps

- To complement its own analysis, the Eurosystem decided to involve an **external and independent** party to assess the incident as well as the recent ones that hit TARGET2 and T2S.
- The scope of the review will be broad enough to allow the Eurosystem to draw general lessons on the proper management of its infrastructures i.e. not only for TARGET 2 but for all TARGET services.
- The scope shall encompass *inter alia* the robustness of the **business continuity** model, the adequacy of the regular **recovery tests**, the efficiency of the **change and release management** and the **communication** protocols (internal and external).
- The work shall start shortly after the designation of the independent reviewer and is currently planned to last until **end of Q1-2021**.
- The main findings of the external review, as well as the responses of the Eurosystem, will be **shared** with market participants (expected Q2 2021).

Questions?