#### Discussion of Cook and Devereux Exchange Rate Flexibility under Zero Lower Bound: the Need for Forward Guidance

#### Giancarlo Corsetti Cambridge and CEPR

ECB-IMF Conference "International dimensions of conventional and unconventional monetary policy" April 29 and 30, 2014

April 29, 2014


# Question and main findings

- OCA: countries with an independent monetary policy are "better off", relative to countries in a monetary union.
- Is this true also when recessionary shocks cause policy rate to hit the ZLB constraint?
- Cook and Devereux provide an analytically rich and rigorous answer:
  - yes under discretion;
  - no under commitment.
- The reason: long-run PPP constrains the dynamics of relative inflation in a currency union: a fall of **inflation below union** average in the short run requires inflation to be above average in the future.
- The commitment to a fixed exchange rate transpires into a **'commitment' to long-run relative prices**, that moderates the costs of policy discretion.

- OCA is a corollary of the general proposition "the set of allocations under flexible exchange rates contain the set of allocations attainable under fixed exchange rates"
  - monetary policy under flex can always mimic m.p. under fixed.
- The Cook-Devereux paper show that the proposition fails in a two country model, if, at the ZLB, policy-making is discretionary whether or not one or both countries are constrained.

- Interpretation from a small-open-economy perspective
- Intervalue of the model to the literature
- Omments and suggestions

In new Keynesian model (with staggered price setting)



where c is interest-sensitive spending and, for simplicity, preferences are assumed to be separable C and leisure.

- Ounder complete markets, the exchange rate SP/P\* is the ratio of foreign to domestic monetary stances augmented with relative demand shifters.
  - Holding  $\xi_t$  fixed, a rise in long term rates brings about a fall in c and an exchange rate appreciation.

## A key result

**Proposition**: in a small open economy in a fixed exchange rates, with nominal rates exogenous to domestic shocks by the Uncovered Interest Parity condition (set be constant for simplicity), the **long-term PPP** implies

$$c_t = \xi_t - \frac{1}{\sigma} \left[ \underbrace{E_t \sum_{\kappa=0}^{\infty} (-\pi_{t+1+\kappa}) + \pi_0}_{= \kappa_t + \frac{1}{\sigma} \cdot \pi_0} - \pi_0 \right] =$$

The endogenous impact of shocks on demand is proportional to the initial (endogenous) bout of inflation. (Corsetti, Kuester and Mueller (CKM) 2010)

• Used by Nakamura & Steinsson, Fahri & Werner among others.

# The CKM result: intuition, corollaries and theoretical contribution

- Long-term PPP implies that any rise on relative Home-to-Foreign inflation in the short run must be reversed at some point by relative deflation.
  - A constant interest rate under a peg is not the same as a constant rate at the zero lower bound: equilibrium is determinate even if the interest rate is not set according to the 'Taylor principle' by virtue of dynamics of relative prices ('explains' Benigno Benigno Ghironi).
  - Speed of adjustment to PPP irrelevant (from staggered pricing decisions) for this result to hold.
- A credible fixed exchange rate is akin to a commitment to a price level target (given by foreign P\*).
- ZLB dynamics cannot occur.

## Contrast with Taylor rule under flexible rates and ZLB


• Flexible rates. With the economy expected to be at the ZLB for *T* periods, letting the response to inflation very aggressive from *T* + 1 on

$$\begin{aligned} c_t - \xi_t &= \frac{1}{\sigma} \left[ E_t \sum_{\kappa=0}^T \left( 0 - \pi_{t+1+\kappa} \right) + E_t \sum_{\kappa=T}^\infty \left( \left( \phi_{\pi} - 1 \right) \pi_{t+1+\kappa} \right) \right] \\ &\simeq \frac{1}{\sigma} \left[ E_t \sum_{\kappa=0}^T \left( \begin{smallmatrix} \text{this is less than zero} \\ \pi_{t+1+\kappa} \end{smallmatrix} \right) \right] \quad \text{versus } \frac{1}{\sigma} \cdot \pi_0 \end{aligned}$$

After a sufficiently low  $\xi_t$ , the economy is dragged down by very large deflation for T period. The corresponding hike in long-term rates appreciates the home currency.

• Fixed exchange rates.  $\pi_0$  is lower: with Calvo pricing, firms respond to the contractionary shock moderately, as they anticipate future positive inflation rates.

• I borrow from Gali and Monacelli a modified Taylor rule assuming



thus combining short-run active stabilization with long-run commitment to exchange rate=price level.

# GM meets CKM: the trade-off between output and ER stabilization


• As long as  $\phi_e > 0$ ,

$$c_t = -rac{\phi_\pi-1}{\sigma}\cdot\pi_0 - rac{1}{\sigma}rac{\phi_s}{1-\phi_s}E_t\sum_{\kappa=0}^\infty s_{t+\kappa}$$

- For a standard value of  $\phi_{\pi}(=1.5)$ , a moderate  $\phi_s$  improves welfare, as a price level targeting harnesses inflation expectations, and inflation dispersion.
- The two terms pull in different direction: as  $\phi_s \rightarrow 1$ , however, monetary policy "stabilizes" less and less. The OCA result dominates.

# Moderate exchange rate targeting contains losses from inflation dispersion

• GM: a Taylor rule with a (moderate) feedback on price level improves welfare (same reasoning as with optimal targeting policy under commitment), for many combinations of wage and price rigidities.



#### (b) Price inflation component

Discussion of CD

- The analysis above takes *P*<sup>\*</sup> as given. What if the shock generates deflation at union level, inducing a drift for the average price level? Does the intuition above still apply?
- Fascinating question: the answer is "yes."
- Great reading delivered in an analytically rich and rigorous way. Great for teaching: authors leave a number of lingering open issues for students to work on.
- Outline:
  - Taylor rule, both countries at ZLB
  - Optimal monetary policy (discretion and commitment); one or both countries at the ZLB.

# 1. Taylor rule analysis

- Main advantage of specification: union-level aggregate independent of exchange rate arrangement, just focus on relative (home to foreign) variables.
- As in Benigno Benigno Ghironi (another missing references), terms of trade obeys

$$au_t = au_{t-1} - \pi_t^{\mathsf{relative}}$$

which is the root of the "*proxy commitment* aspect of a single currency" (page 15).

- Suggestion: be explicit. Credible exchange rates requires full commitment. This translates into an implicit commitment to offset relative deflation with future relative inflation.
  - Because firms anticipate future price offset, the initial response to shocks is moderate.
  - A fixed exchange rate constrained the equilibrium response of relative long-term rates. Without adjustment in *S*, Home deflation coincides with terms of trade improvement.

# 2. Optimal (cooperative) policy analysis

- This is where value added is higher: aggregate dynamics changes across exchange rate arrangement.
  - consider countries sufficiently open to trade, and an asymmetric shock to Home country, that would make the optimal policy rate negative in both countries.
- Cooperation under discretion.
  - **Multiple currencies**, at the ZLB, Foreign may nonetheless raise interest rate: cooperation require foreign to contain deflation at Home, leaning against Home depreciation.
  - **Single currency:** with relative price constraining inflation path, no need for Foreign rate hikes. Overall real rates are lower, demand falls by less, higher welfare.
- Contrast with **Commitment** (forward guidance) obviously reverses the result. Policymakers can credibly pursue the optimal path/price level target.

### Comments

- The analysis assumes complete markets. With incomplete market (condition (3) does not hold), the exchange rate may move in different ways.
  - a conjecture: the intuition above goes through in relative inflation, putting the role of the endogenous adjustment in exchange rates in perspective.
- Nature of the shock and nature of transmission mechanism. There
  are model stressing alternative channels (see Pontus Rendahl work).
- Bringing the model to the euro crisis: does it fit the bill?
  - cheap shot: would the new French franc (let alone the new drachma) appreciate after break up? Sovereign (break up) risk crisis at the ZLB may suggest a different answer.
- Internal tension: monetary policymakers are not credible in pursuing forward guidance, they are perfectly credible in exchange rate commitment.

- Holding PPP (same consumption basket), single and multiple currencies deliver the same welfare. The reader may expect some explanation.
- Useful to clarify the Markov structure of the ZLB state, as in Christiano et al (2011) and Woodford (2011)

### To conclude

- Paper calls attention on another key reason why results and policy prescriptions by the **New**-keynesian challenge **Old**-Keynesian wisdom.
  - not many pieces of conventional wisdom survive.
  - Difference comes from a more structured analysis of dynamics and expectations.
- Dynamic new body of literature rethinking the implications of flex versus float regimes on monetary regimes.
  - *Benigno Benigno Ghironi* "Interest Rate Rules for Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31 (July 2007): 2196-2211.
  - Corsetti Kuester Mueller "Floats, Pegs and the Transmission of Fiscal Policy" joint with K Kuester and G Mueller, in Luis Felipe Cespedes and Jordi Gali (eds.) Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Performance, Santiago, Chile: Central Bank of Chile, 2011.