Reserve Bank of India's Policy Dilemmas: Reconciling Policy Goals in Times of Turbulence

Bruno Carrasco Hiranya Mukhopadhyay

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Outline

- Motivation
- Assess RBI's performance across key policy challenges
- Draw lessons



Motivation

- In a world of increasing and volatile capital flows, central banks face increasing pressures to balance inflation, output and in many EMEs exchange rate stability objectives.
- Paper is more broadly analyzing whether we are asking too much of monetary policy resulting in complex policy dilemmas (Orphanides, 2013).
- While policy objectives tend to be complementary (high π, high y, low k) there are cases when it can be conflicting and resulting in trading off one objective against another (high π, low y, large k).




Some Stylized Facts

- RBI appeared to target inflation and growth over the medium term.
- RBI is not fully autonomous. Credibility is an issue.
- Policy instrument is reported and targets call rate occasionally supplemented by adjustments in CRR.
- Food contributes approximately 50% of CPI basket.
- There have been recent periods of (i) large capital inflows (2007) and subsequent outflows, and (ii) large exchange rate depreciation (2013) followed by some appreciation.
- Managed float exchange rate.
- Source of loanable funds in India is primarily deposit based.




Goal of Paper – Focus on RBI's recent experience to assess performance of policy effectiveness



RBI = Reserve Bank of India. Source: Authors' illustration.



RBI's Performance



GDP = gross domestic product.

Source: Staff estimates based on data from Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MOSPI)

• Over 1995-2012, strike ratio is 28%.




What does the Taylor Rule Reveal?

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Taylor Rule Estimation for India (See also Singh, 2010)

Dependent Variable: Interest Rate Method: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)			
VARIABLES	Coefficients		
VARIADLES	Model 1	Model 2	
Output Gap	0.0527* (1.984)	0.0538** (2.034)	
Interest Rate _(t-1)	0.668*** (7.533)	0.652*** (7.312)	
Inflation (All Commodities)	0.133** (2.033)		
Exchange Rate (Change over the quarters)	0.130 (1.125)	0.157 (1.406)	
Inflation (Non-Food Manufacturing)		0.138* (2.012)	
Constant	1.257* (1.813)	1.545** (2.467)	
Observations	51	51	
R-squared	0.705	0.705	

Actual and Predicted Interest Rate



Source: Staff estimates based on data from CEIC Data Ltd. and RBI


Notes: Interest rate is proxied by the call money rate while output gap is derived from Manufacturing Index of Industrial Production (IIP). We used two measures of inflation, inflation rate using all commodities and using only non-food manufactured products.

Data spanning 2000Q1–2012Q4. t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: Staff estimates based on data from CEIC Data Ltd. and RBI.

- Inflation coefficient is approximately 3X output gap coefficient
- RBI does not directly react to changes in the value of the rupee




To React or Not to React? The Link Between Food Price Inflation and Core Inflation





• At first sight not clear what is the relationship, however generally food inflation is leading core inflation



To React or Not to React? The Link Between Food Price Inflation and Core Inflation: Non-parametric Estimation







Staff estimates based on data from MOSPI


- Result 1: RBI was right to react to food price inflation.
- Result 2: Credibility matters: strong inflation mandates dampens second round effects.



However the story is not complete!

• Assuming RBI intervenes, will it impact aggregate demand?


 \rightarrow We need to analyze the credit market dynamics



• We adopt a sticky price credit disequilibrium model and assume that markets do not adjust instantaneously.



Proposed Disequilibrium Framework



 Use ML techniques to derive the unconditional probabilities of demand constrained regimes (Maddala and Nelson, 1974 and Ghosh and Ghosh, 1999).




Effectiveness and the State of the Credit Market

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Mar-2008 Supply Mar-2009 Demand Mar-2010 Supply Mar-2011	Supply
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Constraints Faced by Credit Market

Source: Staff estimates based on data from CEIC Data Ltd. and RBI.

Policy Effectiveness and the State of the Credit Market



Credit Regimes and the Repo Rates

Source: Staff estimates based on data from RBI


- Despite the supply constrained regime, authorities raised policy rate to contain inflation – may not be effective.
- However, we need to drill deeper to justify our assertion.



Final Missing Link

Two critical assumptions

- Bank lending is driven by deposit mobilization (in India credit to deposit ratio is close to 100%)
- Bank deposits are sensitive to interest rate movements



Relationship between Deposit Rate (1-Year Term Deposit) and

Notes: D1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation/month is demand constrained and equal to zero otherwise. Numbers in parentheses are t-values. Source: Staff estimates based on data from CEIC Data Ltd. and RBI

Bank's act sequentially and raise deposit rates to mobilize additional ۲ lending – in a supply constrained regime.



Did RBI get it right?

(Selective Episodes)

When	Regime	Credit Market	Action Taken	Stance	Effective?	Why?
Sep 2012– Jan 2013	 High inflation Low output Strong capital flows 	Demand constrained	Cut policy rates	Dovish	Yes , expected to stimulate aggregate demand through interest channel	Credit transacted increased and appreciation pressure eased
May 2011– Aug 2011	 High inflation Low output Weak capital flows 	Supply constrained	Hike in policy rates	Hawkish	expected to be effective in containing inflation	Credit transacted increased however perversely supported output growth – through the credit channel – and depreciation expectations eased.



Conclusion

- Taylor rule estimates suggest pursuit of strong inflation fighting stance by RBI in 2000-2012.
- Non-parametric estimates support RBI's decision to react to observed increases in food price inflation.
- Disequilibrium analysis provides useful framework to assess effectiveness of policy decisions across various regimes.
- Main messages is that while we can identify episodes of hawkish and dovish stance, there is no simple policy solution to consistently apply in different circumstances.



Thank you! <u>bcarrasco@adb.org</u> hmukhopadhyay@adb.org

